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ABSTRACT
By studying intrastate branch banking reform in the United States, this paper provides evidence that
financial markets substantively influence the distribution of income. From the 1970s through the 1990s,
most states removed restrictions on intrastate branching, which intensified bank competition and improved
efficiency. Exploiting the cross-state, cross-time variation in the timing of bank deregulation, we evaluate
the impact of liberalizing intrastate branching restrictions on the distribution of income. We find that
branch deregulation significantly reduced income inequality by boosting the incomes of lower income
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This paper assesses how financial markets affect the distribution of income by studying 
intrastate branch banking reform in the United States. From the 1970s through the 1990s, most 
states removed restrictions on intrastate branching, which intensified bank competition and 
improved bank efficiency and performance (Flannery, 1984; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998). While 
researchers have examined the impact of these reforms on aggregate economic activity (e.g., 
Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Black and Strahan, 2002; Huang, 2008; and Kerr and Nanda, 2009), 
we provide the first evaluation of how branch deregulation altered the distribution of income. We 
test whether removing these restrictions intensified, ameliorated, or had no effect on income 
inequality and also study particular channels linking bank deregulation and income distribution. 
  Policy and theoretical debates motivate our analysis (Allen and Gale, 2000). Since Thomas 
Jefferson first opposed the creation of the Bank of the United States, U.S. policymakers have 
expressed concerns that big banks would primarily help the wealthy and widen the distribution of 
income (Hammond, 1957). If banking is a natural monopoly, then unregulated, monopolistic banks 
may earn rents through high fixed fees that disproportionately curtail the economic opportunities of 
the poor (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; and Galor and Zeira, 
1993). Based on this argument, politicians in many U.S. states implemented and maintained 
restrictions on bank branching for much of the 20
th century (Southworth, 1928; White, 1982). 
Furthermore, most countries regulate bank mergers and acquisitions, with the advertised goals of 
constraining the expansion of powerful banks and expanding access to credit (Barth et al, 2006).  
Countervailing arguments, however, challenge the view that regulations on bank expansion 
help the poor. These regulations could curtail competition and raise fees that disproportionately hurt 
the poor. Indeed, Flannery (1984) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that U.S. branching 
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higher fees and interest rate margins. From this perspective, intrastate branch deregulation will 
operate on the extensive margin, disproportionately expanding economic opportunities for the poor.   
  The deregulation of intrastate branching provides a natural setting for identifying and 
assessing the impact of bank regulatory reform on the distribution of income. As shown by 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999), national technological innovations triggered branch deregulation at 
the state level. Specifically, (1) the invention of automatic teller machines (ATMs), in conjunction 
with court rulings that ATMs are not bank branches, weakened the geographical bond between 
customers and banks; (2) checkable money market mutual funds facilitated banking by mail and 
telephone, which weakened local bank monopolies; and, (3) improvements in communications 
technology lowered the costs of using distant banks. These innovations reduced the monopoly 
power of local banks, weakening their ability and desire to fight against deregulation. Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999) further show that cross-state variation in the timing of deregulation reflects the 
interactions of these national technological innovations with preexisting state-specific conditions. 
For example, deregulation occurred later in states where politically powerful groups viewed large, 
multiple-branch banks as potentially serious competitors. Moreover, as we demonstrate below, 
neither the level nor rate of change in the distribution of income before deregulation helps predict 
when a state removed restrictions on bank branching, suggesting that the timing of branch 
deregulation at the state level is exogenous to the state’s distribution of income. Consequently, we 
employ a difference-in-differences estimation methodology that exploits the exogenous cross-state, 
cross-year variation in the timing of branch deregulation to assess the causal impact of bank 
deregulation on the distribution of income.  
  2    The paper’s major finding is that deregulation of branching restrictions substantively 
tightened the distribution of income by disproportionately helping lower income workers. While 
income inequality widened in the overall U.S. economy during the sample period, branch 
deregulation lowered inequality relative to this national trend. This finding is robust to using 
different measures of income inequality, controlling for time-varying state characteristics, and 
conditioning on both state and year fixed effects. We find no evidence that reverse causality or prior 
trends in the distribution of income account for these findings. Furthermore, the economic 
magnitude is consequential. Seven years after deregulation, the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality is about four percent lower than before deregulation after conditioning on state and year 
fixed effects. Put differently, deregulation explains about 60% of the de-trended variation of 
inequality relative to state and year averages. 
Removing restrictions on intrastate bank branching reduced inequality by boosting the 
incomes of the relatively poor, not by hurting higher income workers. Deregulation increased the 
average incomes of those in the bottom quarter of the income distribution by more than five percent, 
but deregulation did not significantly affect the incomes of those in the upper half of the distribution 
of income. These results are consistent with the view that the removal of intrastate branching 
restrictions triggered changes in banking behavior that had disproportionately positive repercussions 
on lower income individuals. 
To provide additional evidence that bank deregulation tightened the distribution of income 
by affecting bank performance and not through some other mechanism, we show that the impact of 
deregulation on the distribution of income varied across states in a theoretically predictable manner. 
In particular, if branch deregulation tightened the distribution of income by improving the operation 
of banks, then deregulation should have had a more pronounced effect on the distribution of income 
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deregulation. Based on Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we use four indicators of the degree to which 
intrastate branching restrictions hurt bank performance prior to deregulation. For example, in states 
with a more geographically diffuse population, branching restrictions were particularly effective at 
creating local banking monopolies that hindered bank performance. After deregulating, therefore, 
we should observe a bigger effect on bank performance in states with more diffuse populations. 
This is what we find. Across the four indicators of the cross-state severity of branching restrictions, 
we find that deregulation reduced income inequality more in those states where these branching 
restrictions had been particularly harmful to bank operations. These findings increase confidence in 
the interpretation that deregulation reduced income inequality by enhancing bank performance. 
  We finish by conducting a preliminary exploration of three possible explanations of the 
labor market channels underlying these findings. We view this component of the analysis as a 
preliminary exploration because each of these explanations warrants independent investigation with 
individual-level, longitudinal datasets. Nevertheless, we provide this extension to further motivate 
and guide future research on the channels linking bank performance and the distribution of income. 
The first two explanations stress the ability of the poor to access banking services directly. 
In Galor and Zeira (1993), for example, credit market imperfections prevent the poor from 
borrowing to invest more in education, which hinders their access to higher paying jobs. 
Deregulation that eases these credit constraints, therefore, allows lower income individuals to invest 
more in education, reducing inequality. A second explanation focuses on the ability of the poor to 
become entrepreneurs. In Banerjee and Newman (1993), financial imperfections are particularly 
binding on the poor because they lack collateral and because their incomes are relatively low 
compared to the fixed costs of obtaining bank loans. Thus, deregulation that improves bank 
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benefit the poor by expanding their access to bank credit.  
A third explanation highlights the response of firms to the lower interest rates triggered by 
deregulation, rather than stressing increased access to credit by lower income individuals. While the 
drop in the cost of capital encourages firms to substitute capital for labor, the cost reduction also 
increases production, boosting the demand for capital and labor. On net, if the drop in the cost of 
capital increases the demand for labor and this increase falls disproportionately on lower income 
workers, then deregulation could reduce inequality by affecting firms’ demand for labor. 
  Although branch deregulation stimulated entrepreneurship and increased education, our 
results suggest that deregulation reduced income inequality primarily by boosting the relative 
demand for low-income workers. More specifically, deregulation dramatically increased the rate of 
new incorporations (Black and Strahan, 2002) and the rates of entry and exit of non-incorporated 
firms (Kerr and Nanda, 2009). However, we find that the reduction in total income inequality is 
fully accounted for by a reduction in earnings inequality among salaried employees, not by a 
movement of lower income workers into higher paying self-employed activities or by a change in 
income differentials among the self-employed. Furthermore, the self-employed account for only 
about 10% of the working age population, and this percentage did not change significantly after 
deregulation. On education, Levine and Rubinstein (2009) find that the fall in interest rates caused 
by bank deregulation reduced high school dropout rates in lower income households. Yet, changes 
in educational attainment do not account for the reduction in income inequality triggered by branch 
deregulation during our sample period. Rather, consistent with the view that bank deregulation 
increased the relative demand for low-income workers, we find that deregulation increased the 
earnings of low-education workers relative to workers with more education. 
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international policy community increasingly emphasizes the benefits of providing the poor with 
greater access to financial services as a vehicle for fighting poverty and reducing inequality. 
Burgess and Pande (2007) find that when India reformed its banking laws to provide the poor with 
greater access to financial services, this policy change reduced poverty by boosting wages in rural 
areas. Our findings also suggest that financial development might help the poor primarily by 
intensifying competition and boosting wage earnings, not by increasing the business income of the 
poor. Second, following the onset of the current financial crisis, many stress the potential dangers of 
financial deregulation. Though our work does not address the causes of the crisis, the results do 
indicate that regulations that impeded competition among banks during the 20
th century were 
disproportionately harmful to lower income individuals. Thus, reforms to bank regulations could 
substantively affect the distribution of income. Finally, our work complements recent cross-country 
analyses of finance and the distribution of income. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) find 
that an overall index of banking sector development is associated with lower income inequality 
across countries. We improve on this work by analyzing the impact of a specific, exogenous policy 
change rather than a broad index of financial development and by using a differences-in-differences 
methodology rather than simple cross-country comparison that combine to yield sharper inferences 
about a policy change and reduce concerns about endogeneity bias. 
  This paper also relates to a substantive body of work on the effects of branch deregulation. 
Besides the investigations discussed above, researchers have examined the impact of branch 
deregulation on output volatility (Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sorensen, 2007; Acharya, Imbs and 
Sturgess, 2008), the wage rate gap between men and women bank executives (Black and Strahan, 
2001), and the income growth of proprietors differentiated by race and gender (Demyanyk, 2007). 
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overall economy and help resolve a debate about bank regulation that extends over two centuries. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
econometric methodology. Section 3 provides the core results, while Section 4 provides further 
evidence on how deregulation influences labor market conditions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
  To assess the effect of branch deregulation on income distribution, we gather data on the 
timing of deregulation, income distribution, and other banking sector and state-level characteristics. 
This section presents the data and describes the econometric methods.  
2.1. Branch deregulation 
  Historically, most U.S. states had restrictions on branching within and across state borders. 
With regards to intrastate branching restrictions, most states allowed bank hold companies to own 
separately capitalized and licensed banks throughout a state. Other states were “unit banking states,” 
in which each bank was typically permitted to operate only one office.  
Beginning in the early 1970s, states started relaxing these restrictions, allowing bank 
holding companies to consolidate subsidiaries into branches and permitting de novo branching 
throughout the state. This deregulation led to significant entry into local banking markets (Amel and 
Liang, 1992), consolidation of smaller banks into large bank holding companies (Savage, 1993; 
Calem, 1994), and conversion of existing bank subsidiaries into branches (McLaughin, 1995). This 
relaxation, however, came gradually, with the last states lifting restrictions following the 1994 
passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act.  
  7  Consistent with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), and others, we choose the date of 
deregulation as the date on which a state permitted branching via mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
through the holding company structure, which was the first step in the deregulation process, 
followed by de novo branching. Appendix Table 1 presents the deregulation dates.  Twelve states 
deregulated before the start of our sample period in 1976. Arkansas, Iowa and Minnesota were the 
last states to deregulate, only after the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994. We have data for 50 
states and the District of Columbia. Consistent with the literature on branch deregulation, we drop 
Delaware and South Dakota because the structure of their banking systems were heavily affected by 
laws that made them centers for the credit card industry. 
Over this period, states also deregulated restrictions on interstate banking by allowing bank 
holding companies to expand across state borders. We confirm this paper’s results using the date of 
interstate deregulation instead of the date of intrastate deregulation. However, when we 
simultaneously control for inter- and intrastate branch deregulation, we find that only intrastate 
deregulation enters significantly. Thus, we focus on intrastate rather than interstate deregulation 
throughout the remainder of this paper. 
2.2. Income distribution data 
Information on the distribution of income is from the March Supplement of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), which is an annual survey of about 60,000 households across the United 
States. The CPS is a repeated, representative sampling of the population, but it does not trace 
individuals through time. The CPS provides information on total personal income, wage and salary 
income (earnings), proprietor income, income from other sources, and a wide-array of demographic 
characteristics in the year prior to the survey. Most importantly for our study, we start with the 1977 
survey because the exact state of residence is unavailable prior to this survey. Each individual in the 
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population. We use sampling weights in all our analyses. 
We measure the distribution of income for each state and year over the period 1976-2006 in 
four ways. First, the Gini coefficient of income distribution is derived from the Lorenz curve. 
Larger values of the Gini coefficient imply greater income inequality. The Gini coefficient equals 
zero if everyone receives the same income, and equals one if a single individual receives all of the 
economy’s income. We frequently use the logarithm of the Gini coefficient in the regression 
analyses. Our second measure of income distribution is the Theil index, which is also increasing in 
the degree of income inequality. If all individuals receive the same income, the Theil index equals 
zero, while the Theil index equals Ln(n) if one individual receives all of the economy’s income, 
where n equals the number of individuals. An advantage of the Theil index is that it is 
computationally easy to decompose it into inequality accounted for by differences in income 
between groups in the sample and inequality accounted for by differences among those within each 
group of the sample. Third, we examine the difference between the natural logarithm of incomes of 
those at the 90
th percentile and those at the 10
th percentile (Log (90/10)). Finally, we use the 
difference between the natural logarithm of incomes of those at the 75
th percentile and those at the 
25
th percentile ((Log (75/25)). Appendix Table 2 provides more detailed information on the 
construction of these income distribution indicators. 
Consistent with studies of the U.S. labor market, our main sample (a) includes prime-age 
(25-54) civilians that have non-negative personal income, (b) excludes individuals with missing 
observations on key variables (education, demographics, etc), (c) excludes the richest 1% of 
individuals, (d) excludes people living in group quarters, (e) excludes individuals who receive zero 
income and live in households with zero or negative income from all sources of income, and (f) 
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Appendix Table 3 provides details on the construction of the sample.  
There are 1,859,411 individuals in our sample. Table 1A provides summary statistics on the 
sample of individuals, while Table 1B gives summary statistics on the income inequality measures. 
The average age in the sample is 38 years, 49% are female, and 75% are white, non-Hispanic 
individuals. In the sample, 49% have a high school degree or less, while 27% graduated from 
college. Only 9% of the individuals report being self-employed (entrepreneurs).  
In Table 1B, we present basic descriptive statistics on the four measures of income 
inequality, which are measured at the state-year level. In particular, we have data for the 31 years 
between 1976 and 2006 and for 48 states plus the District of Columbia. Thus, there are 1,519 state-
year observations. Besides providing information on the means of the inequality indicators and their 
minimum and maximum values, we also present three types of standard deviations of the natural 
logarithms of the inequality indexes: cross-state, within-state, and within state-year. These standard 
deviations help in assessing the economic magnitude of the impact of bank branch deregulation on 
the distribution of the income that we report below. 
2.3. Control variables 
To control for time-varying changes in a state’s economy, we use the U.S. Department of 
Commerce data to calculate the growth rate of per capita Gross State Product (GSP). We also 
control for the unemployment rate, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and a number of 
state-specific, time-varying socio-demographic characteristics, including the percentage of high-
school dropouts, the proportion of blacks, and the proportion of female-headed households. 
We also test whether the impact of deregulation on income inequality varies in a predictable 
way with different state characteristics at the time of deregulation. As we discuss below, we control 
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small firm share and population dispersion, each of which we measure in the year before 
deregulation. The unit banking indicator equals one if the state had unit banking restrictions prior to 
deregulation and zero otherwise. The following states had unit banking before deregulation: 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The small bank share equals 
the fraction of banking assets in the state that are held by banks with assets below the median size 
bank of each state, while the small firm share equals the proportion of all establishments operating 
in a state with fewer than twenty employees. Data on the small firm share and small bank share are 
from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). Population dispersion equals one divided by population per 
square mile, which is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
2.4. Methodology 
  We use a difference-in-differences specification to assess the relation between branch 
deregulation and income distribution, based on the following regression set-up: 
Ys,t = Αs + Βt + βDs,t + δXs,t + εs,t,         s = 1, …, 49;     t = 1976, …, 2006.                (1) 
In equation (1), Ys,t is a measure of income distribution in state s in year t, Αs and Βt are vectors of 
state and year dummy variables that account for state and year fixed-effects, Xs,t is a set of time-
varying, state-level variables and εs,t is the error term. The variable of interest is Ds,t, a dummy 
variable that equals one in the years after state s deregulates and equals zero otherwise. The 
coefficient, β, therefore indicates the impact of branch deregulation on income distribution. A 
positive and significant β suggests that deregulation exerts a positive effect on the degree of income 
inequality, while a negative and significant β indicates that deregulation pushed income inequality 
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state-year observations serve as the basis for much of our analysis. 
  The difference-in differences estimation technique allows us to control for omitted variables. 
We include year-specific dummy variables to control for nation-wide shocks and trends that shape 
income distribution over time, such as business cycles, national changes in regulations and laws, 
long-term trends in income distribution, and changes in female labor force participation. We include 
state-specific dummy variables to control for time-invariant, unobserved state characteristics that 
shape income distribution across states. We estimate equation (1) allowing for state-level clustering, 
i.e. allowing for correlation in the error terms over time within states. 
 
3. Branch deregulation and income distribution 
3.1. Preliminary results 
Our empirical analysis rests on the assumption that the cross-state timing of bank branch 
deregulation was unaffected by the distribution of income. Figure 1 shows that neither the level of 
the Gini coefficient before deregulation nor its rate of change prior to deregulation explains the 
timing of branch deregulation. In a regression of the year of deregulation on the average Gini 
coefficient before deregulation or the rate of change of the Gini coefficient in the years before 
deregulation, the t-statistic on the inequality indicators are 0.20 and -1.16 respectively. Furthermore, 
in unreported robustness tests, we find that changes in the state-specific labor protection laws 
examined by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) do not predict the timing of branch deregulation. 
Additional evidence that income inequality did not affect the timing of branch deregulation 
emerges from a hazard model study of deregulation. Following Kroszner and Strahan (1999), Table 
2 reports tests of whether the Gini coefficient of income inequality influences the likelihood that a 
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Strahan (1999) sample period starts in 1970, we do not have Gini data available before 1976. Also, 
since we use the original Kroszner and Strahan (1999) dataset, our sample period ends in 1994, 
when there were three states that had not deregulated yet – Arkansas, Iowa and Minnesota.  
Table 2 indicates that the timing of bank branch deregulation does not vary with the degree 
of income inequality. Column 1 reports the results of a regression with only the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality, while columns 2 – 5 provide regression results controlling for numerous state-
level control variables, including those state characteristics employed by Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999). As in Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we find that states with a larger share of small banks 
and better capitalized small banks deregulate later, while states with a higher share of small firms 
deregulate earlier. As shown, the Gini coefficient does not enter significantly in any of the Table 2 
regressions. 
3.2. Deregulation and the distribution of income 
In Table 3, we assess the impact of branch deregulation on income inequality using four 
indicators of income inequality and two regression specifications. In Panel A, the regressions 
simply condition on state and year fixed effects, which are not reported. Panel B also includes 
numerous time-varying, state-specific characteristics: the growth rate of per capita gross state 
product, the proportion of blacks in the population, the proportion of high-school dropouts in the 
population, the proportion of female-headed households in the population, and the unemployment 
rate. 
The Table 3 results indicate that bank branch deregulation substantially reduced income 
inequality. The branch deregulation dummy enters negatively and significantly at the 5% level in all 
eight regressions. For example, consider the Gini coefficient. The column 1 results suggest that 
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gauge the economic effect of this result, we compare the coefficient estimate to the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of the Gini coefficient after accounting for state and year fixed effects. 
This standard deviation is 0.037 as shown in Table 1, suggesting that branching deregulation 
explains about 60% of the variation of income inequality relative to state and year averages.  
The Table 3 results indicate that deregulation tightened the distribution of income even 
when conditioning on time-varying state-level factors. Higher unemployment is associated with 
higher income inequality, though the other state characteristics do not enter independently 
significantly. This does not imply that these other characteristics, such as per capita economic 
growth, an economy’s socio-demographic traits, or educational attainment, are unrelated to income 
inequality. Rather, it suggests that after conditioning on state and year fixed effects, unemployment, 
and branch deregulation, there is not a significant, independent link between each of these traits and 
the various measures of income inequality. Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, the 
results on deregulation are robust to conditioning on these factors.  
Additional robustness tests confirm these findings. Controlling for the size of each state’s 
aggregate economy, the level of real per capita income in each state, or lagged values of each state’s 
Gini coefficient yields similar results. We were also concerned that the migration of labor across 
state lines could affect the results. If deregulation induces interstate labor reallocations that tighten 
the distribution of income, we want to identify and understand these dynamics. In unreported 
regressions, we regress the share of immigrants per state-year on the branch deregulation dummy, 
while controlling for year and state-fixed effects. We did not find any significant effects of branch 
deregulation on migration flows. We also controlled for migration flows directly in the Table 3 
regressions and obtain the same conclusions. Thus, interstate labor migration does not seem to be 
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individual income.  
3.3. Dynamics of deregulation and the distribution of income 
We next examine the dynamics of the relation between deregulation and inequality. We do 
this by including a series of dummy variables in the standard regression to trace out the year-by-
year effects of intrastate deregulation one the logarithm of the Gini coefficient: 




st + … + β25D
+15
st + As +Bt +  εst,                           (2) 
 
where the deregulation dummy variables, the “D’s,” equal zero, except as follows: D
-j equals one 
for states in the j
th year before deregulation, while D
+j equals one for states in the j
th year after 
deregulation. We exclude the year of deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of 
deregulation on income distribution relative to the year of deregulation. As and Bt are vectors of 
state and year dummy variables, respectively. At the end points, D
-10
st equals one for all year that 
are ten or more years before deregulation, while D
+15
st equals one for all years that are fifteen or 
more years after deregulation. Thus, there is much greater variance for these end points and the 
estimates may be measured with less precision. Figure 2 plots the results and the 95% confidence 
intervals, centering the estimates around year 0, the year of deregulation.  
Figure 2 illustrates two key points: innovations in the distribution of income did not precede 
deregulation and the impact of deregulation on inequality materializes very quickly. As shown, the 
coefficients on the deregulation dummy variables are insignificantly different from zero for all years 
before deregulation, with no trends in inequality prior to branch deregulation. Next, note that 
inequality falls immediately after deregulation, such that D
+1 is negative and significant at the 5% 
level. Thus, the particular mechanisms and channels connecting bank deregulation with the 
distribution of income must be fast acting. The impact of deregulation on inequality grows for about 
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Gini coefficient of inequality of about 3.5%. In sum, changes in inequality do not precede 
deregulation and deregulation has a level effect on inequality, but does not have a trend effect. 
3.4. Deregulation and income for different income groups 
Although the results demonstrate that income inequality fell after intrastate branch 
deregulation, the analyses do not yet provide information on whether the distribution of income 
tightened because the rich got poorer, or because deregulation disproportionately helped the poor. 
We now address this issue by examining the impact of branch deregulation on the incomes of 
individuals across the full distribution of incomes. More specifically, we compute the logarithm of 
income for the ith percentile of the distribution of income in each state s and year t, Y(i)s,t. We do 
this for i equal to 5, 10, 15, …, 90, 95. We then run 19 regressions of the form: 
                                  Y(i)st = α + γDst + As +Bt + εst,                                                          (3) 
where the regressions are run for each ith percentile of the income distribution. Figure 3 depicts the 
estimated coefficient, γ, from each of these 19 regressions and also indicates whether the estimates 
are significant at the 5% level. 
Figure 3 shows that intrastate branch deregulation tightened the distribution of income by 
disproportionately helping relatively low income individuals. Deregulation boosted the incomes of 
those with incomes below the 40
th percentile. Deregulation did not have a significant impact on 
others. Rather than reducing the incomes of relatively high income individuals, deregulation 
reduced income inequality by increasing the incomes of the comparatively poor. 
  163.5. Mechanism: impact of deregulation as a function of initial conditions 
We next assess whether the impact of deregulation on the distribution of income varies in 
predictable ways across states with different initial conditions. If the impact of deregulation on 
income inequality varies in a theoretically predictable manner, this provides greater confidence in 
the conclusions, sheds empirical light on the mechanisms through which deregulation influences the 
distribution of income, and also reduces concerns about reverse causality. 
If bank deregulation reduced income inequality by boosting bank performance, then the 
impact of bank deregulation should be stronger in states where branch regulation had a more 
harmful effect on bank performance prior to deregulation. Following Kroszner and Strahan (1999), 
we consider four initial conditions that reflect the harmful effects of branch regulation before 
deregulation. First, unit banking -- where states typically restricted banks to having one office -- 
was the most extreme form of branching restriction and exerted the biggest effect on bank 
performance before deregulation. Thus, we expect that deregulation exerted a particularly large 
impact on income inequality in states that had unit banks before they deregulated.
 Second, states 
with a high share of small banks will tend to benefit disproportionately from branching restrictions 
that protect small banks from competition. Thus, we expect that deregulation had an especially large 
impact on inequality in states with a comparatively high ratio of small banks at the time of 
deregulation. Third, small firms tend to face greater barriers to obtaining credit from distant banks 
than larger firms, suggesting that local branching restrictions that protect local banking monopolies 
were particularly harmful in states dominated by small firms. Thus, we expect that deregulation had 
a bigger impact in states with a large proportion of small firms prior to deregulation. Finally, we 
examine population dispersion. Local banking monopolies will be particularly well-protected if the 
population is diffuse, so that other banks tend to be far away. This suggests that deregulation would 
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conditions are not independent. States that had adopted unit banking before deregulation tended to 
have a higher share of small banks and firms and more dispersed populations. The correlations 
between the four characteristics are far from perfect, however. The highest pair-wise correlation 
coefficient is 0.53. Since we do not have strong reasons to favor one indicator over another, we 
provide the results on each in our assessment of whether intrastate branch deregulation has a 
particularly large effect on the distribution of income in those economies where theory suggests the 
impact will be largest. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the impact of branch deregulation on income inequality 
was stronger in states where branching restrictions had been especially harmful to bank activities 
before deregulation. As shown in Table 4, branch deregulation reduced income inequality more in 
states that had (a) unit banking (column 1), (b) a more dispersed population (column 2), (c) a higher 
share of small banks (column 3), and (d) a larger share of small firms (column 4). More specifically, 
deregulation exerted a strong, negative effect on inequality in unit banking states, while this effect 
was weaker, both economically and statistically, in non-unit banking states. In terms of population 
dispersion, the share of small banks, and the share of small firms, the results indicate that branch 
deregulation exerted an economically large and statistically significant impact on income inequality 
in those states with above the median values of these pre-deregulation characteristics. Branch 
deregulation reduced inequality more in states where branching restrictions had been particularly 
harmful to the operation of the banking system before liberalization, suggesting that branch 
deregulation tightened the distribution of income by enhancing bank performance. 
 
  184. Labor market channels 
4.1. Theories of how financial markets affect labor markets and the distribution of income 
Having found that branch deregulation decreased income inequality by affecting bank 
performance, we now explore three potential channels underlying these findings. The first two 
explanations rely on (i) branch deregulation improving the ability of the poor to access banking 
services directly and (ii) the poor using this improved access to either purchase more education or 
become entrepreneurs. The third explanation focuses on firms’ demand for labor, not on the poor 
directly using financial services. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. 
In terms of entrepreneurship, financial imperfections represent particularly severe 
impediments to poor individuals opening their own businesses for two key reasons: (1) the poor 
have comparatively little collateral and (2) the fixed costs of borrowing are relatively high for the 
poor. From this perspective, branch deregulation that improves credit markets will lower the 
barriers to entrepreneurship disproportionately for poor individuals (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). 
  In terms of human capital accumulation, financial imperfections in conjunction with the high 
cost of schooling represent particularly pronounced barriers to the poor purchasing education, 
perpetuating income inequality (Galor and Zeira, 1993). In this context, financial reforms that ease 
financial market imperfections will reduce income inequality by allowing talented, but poor, 
individuals to borrow and purchase education.  
Textbook price theory provides a third channel through which bank deregulation affects 
income inequality that does not involve the poor directly increasing their use of financial services. 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that branch deregulation reduced the cost of capital. Reductions 
in the cost of capital induce firms to (1) substitute capital for labor and (2) expand output, which 
increases demand for capital and labor. On net, if the output effect dominates, the reduction in the 
  19cost of capital will increase the demand for labor. Even under these conditions, however, the impact 
of deregulation on inequality is ambiguous because we do not know if the increased demand for 
labor falls primarily on higher- or lower-income workers. If deregulation disproportionately 
increases the demand for lower-income workers, then branch deregulation could tighten the 
distribution of income by affecting firms’ demand for labor, not by directly increasing the use of 
financial services by relatively low-income individuals.  
4.2. Evidence on banks, inequality, and labor markets  
To provide an initial assessment of the entrepreneurship channel, we decompose the impact 
of bank branch deregulation on income inequality into that part accounted for by a reduction in the 
income gap between the self-employed and wage earners and that part accounted for by a reduction 
in income inequality within the self-employed and within wage earners. We conduct this 
decomposition in two-steps. First, using the Theil index, we decompose income inequality into the 
“between” component, which measures income inequality between the self-employed and wage 
earners, and the “within” component, which is composed of inequality among the self-employed 
and inequality among wage earners. This decomposition is done for each state and year. We then 
estimate the impact of deregulation on each of these components controlling for state and year fixed 
effects. This yields that part of the estimated change in income inequality from deregulation that is 
accounted by a reduction in inequality between the self-employed and wage earners and that part 
accounted for by a reduction in inequality within the two groups.   
Enhanced entrepreneurship does not directly account for the impact of deregulation on the 
distribution of income. As shown in Panel A of Table 5, none of the change in income inequality is 
accounted for by a reduction in between group inequality. All of the reduction in income inequality 
from deregulation is accounted for by a reduction in income inequality among salaried workers. The 
  20change in between group inequality is actually positive, but insignificant. These results are 
unsurprising in light of the following observations: (1) the self-employed account for only 9% of the 
sample, (2) the proportion self-employed individuals did not increase following branch 
deregulation, and (3) the self-employed do not, on average, have higher incomes than salaried 
employees after accounting for educational differences (Hamilton, 2000). These results do not 
suggest that the relation between branch deregulation and entrepreneurship is unimportant. Bank 
deregulation boosted the rate of entry and exit of firms (Black and Strahan, 2002; Kerr and Nanda, 
2009). Nonetheless, the decomposition findings indicate that direct changes in entrepreneurial 
income and the movement of lower-income salaried workers into higher-income entrepreneurial 
activities do not account for the tightening of the distribution of income following deregulation. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we conduct a similar decomposition but focus on education groups. 
We divide the sample into those with some education beyond a high school degree (about 51% of 
the sample) and those with educational attainment of a high school degree or less (about 49% of the 
sample).  Since Panel A showed that all of the reduction in income inequality is accounted for by a 
reduction in inequality among wage earners, we focus only on wage earners in conducting the 
decomposition by educational attainment. 
The reduction in income inequality triggered by branch deregulation is accounted for by 
both a closing of the gap between low- and high-educated workers and by a fall in inequality among 
low-educated workers. From Panel B of Table 5, 73% (0.0074/0.0102) overall income inequality is 
accounted for by a reduction in inequality within the two education categories, and the bulk of this 
reduction arises because of a tightening of the distribution of income among the less-educated 
group. Furthermore, 27% (0.0028/0.0102) of the reduction in income inequality explained by bank 
deregulation is accounted for by a reduction in the income gap between education groups. The 
  21between group results are consistent with at least two possible explanations: (1) bank deregulation 
eased credit constraints and induced lower-income individuals to increase their investment in 
education, thereby reducing income inequality and (2) bank deregulation increased the demand for 
workers in the lower-education group, reducing between group inequality.  
To help distinguish among possible explanations for these findings, Table 6 presents two 
additional analyses. First, we test whether bank deregulation lowers earnings inequality among 
workers of different ages. Besides examining workers between the ages of 25 and 54 as above, we 
also assess the 30-54 and 53-54 age groups. Since Figure 3 shows that the impact of deregulation on 
income inequality is almost immediate and Levine and Rubinstein (2009) find that the main impact 
of deregulation on education involves a reduction in high school dropout rates, then if deregulation 
is reducing earnings inequality by increasing education we should obverse this primarily among the 
relatively young workers, not those who are older than 30 or 35. If we find the relation between 
deregulation and earnings inequality across the different age groups, this suggests that increased 
educational attainment is not the primary channel during our estimation period.  
Second, we more directly control for education by eliminating the educational attainment 
component of wage earnings. Specifically, in the analyses thus far, we have computed measures of 
earnings inequality based on the unconditional wage earnings of individuals. We now condition 
each individual’s earnings on educational attainment. That is, we compute that part of an 
individual’s earnings that are unexplained by years of education. Then, we assess the impact of 
branch deregulation on measures of earnings inequality that are computed based on conditional 
earnings. If branch deregulation also reduces these conditional earnings inequality measure, this 
suggests that deregulation is not reducing earnings inequality only by its affect on educational 
attainment. In particular, we first regress log earnings on six dummy variables corresponding to the 
  22number of years of educational attainment (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, 16, and more than 15 and year 
fixed effects. We then collect the residuals to calculate the conditional earnings inequality measures. 
In unreported robustness tests, we also condition on gender and ethnicity, and obtain the same 
results.  
As shown in Table 6, education does not account for the impact of bank deregulation on 
earnings inequality, suggesting that branch deregulation reduced earnings inequality primarily by 
boosting firms’ relative demand for low-income workers. First, across the four earnings inequality 
indicators, we obtain very similar results when using different age samples of workers as reported in 
Panels A-C. The easing of credit constraints in response to bank deregulation is most likely to affect 
the educational choices of individuals in school, or just out of school. It seems unlikely that branch 
deregulation will cause a sufficiently large and rapid increase in the educational attainment of 
workers above the age of 35, such that the resulting increase in earnings would tighten economy-
wide measures of earnings inequality in the year after deregulation. Second, bank deregulation 
reduces conditional earnings inequality, where the conditioning is done based on educational 
attainment. As shown in Panel D, the estimated impact of deregulation on earnings inequality holds 
for unconditional and conditional earnings. These findings imply that deregulation is not reducing 
earnings inequality only through its affect on educational attainment. Rather, though needing 
additional research, the findings are more consistent with the view that bank branch deregulation 
reduced earnings inequality by boosting the relative demand for low-income workers. 
 
  235. Conclusions 
  Policymakers and economists disagree sharply about the impact of bank regulations on the 
distribution of income. While some argue that the unregulated expansion of large banks will 
increase banking fees and reduce the economic opportunities of the poor, others hold that 
regulations restrict competition, protect monopolistic banks, and widen the distribution of income. 
More generally, an influential political economy literature stresses that income distributional 
considerations, rather than efficiency considerations, frequently exert the dominant influence on 
bank regulations as discussed in Claessens and Perotti (2007) and Haber and Perotti (2008).  
  We find that liberalizing restrictions on intrastate branching across the states of the U.S. 
tightened the distribution of income. This finding is robust to an array of sensitivity analyses. We 
find no evidence that reverse causality drives the results. Moreover, the impact of deregulation on 
income distribution varies in a theoretically predictable manner across states with distinct economic, 
financial, and demographic characteristics at the time of deregulation. Critically, deregulation 
tightened the distribution of income by disproportionately helping the poor, not by hurting the rich. 
These findings support the view that branch regulation in the United States restricted competition, 
protected local banking monopolies, and impeded the economic opportunities of the relatively poor.  
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SUMMARY STATISTICS ON INDIVIDUALS 
   Mean  Min  Max 
Age 38.4  25  54 
      
Female 0.49  0  1 
      
White, non-Hispanic  0.75  0  1 
      
Black, non-Hispanic  0.11  0  1 
      
Hispanic 0.09  0  1 
      
High-school dropout  0.13  0  1 
      
High-school grad  0.36  0  1 
      
Some college education  0.24  0  1 
      
College grad or advanced degree  0.27  0  1 
      
Wage or salary earner  0.80  0  1 
      
Entrepreneur 0.09  0  1 
      
Total personal income ($2000)  32,369  0  385,961 
NOTE – The table provides summary statistics for the sample of respondents 
to March Current Population Surveys in the years 1977-2007. The sample is 
subject to restrictions described in Appendix Table 3. The number of 
observations in the sample is 1,859,411. The mean values in the first column 
are weighted by CPS sampling weights. Total personal income is adjusted to 
constant 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
  Table 1B 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INCOME INEQUALITY 
          Standard deviation of logs 







Gini coefficient  1,519  0.431  0.334 0.532  0.045  0.047  0.037 
             
Theil  index  1,519  0.326 0.187  0.506 0.105  0.098  0.080 
             
Log(90/10) ratio  1,519  2.772  1.653 10.797  0.636  0.380  0.329 
             
Log(75/25) ratio  1,519  1.218  0.747 2.637  0.146  0.127  0.094 
NOTE – The table provides descriptive statistics for the following measures of income inequality: [1] Gini coefficient, [2] Theil index, 
[3] log ratio of the 90th and 10th percentiles of the income distribution, and [4] log ration of the 75th and 25th percentiles of the income 
distribution. Each measure of inequality is based on total personal income of respondents to March Current Population Surveys 
described in Table 1A. We use sampling weights in all calculations of inequality measures. Inequality measures are discussed in 
more details in Appendix Table 2. The number of observations in the table corresponds to 49 states (we exclude Delaware and 
South Dakota) times 31 years between 1976 and 2006. For each measure of inequality we report the mean, the minimum and the 
maximum values, as well as the standard deviation of log of each measure (except log(90/10) and log(75/25) which are already in 
logs). We report three types of standard deviations: cross-state, within-state, and within state-year. These standard deviations are 
useful in calculating the economic magnitude of the impact of bank deregulation on income inequality. 
 
  Table 2 
TIMING OF BANK DEREGULATION AND PRE-EXISTING INCOME INEQUALITY: THE DURATION MODEL 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Gini coefficient  .02  .02  .03  .03  .01 
 
(.03) (.05) (.02) (.03)  (.03) 













































Small bank asset share of all banking  
   
6.62*** 7.53*** 8.17*** 
assets in the state 
   
(2.36) (2.06)  (1.70) 
Capital ratio of small banks relative 
   
12.00** 9.00**  10.00** 
 to large in the state 
   
(5.14) (3.69)  (4.20) 
Relative size of insurance in states  
   
3.76 1.99 .90 
where banks may sell insurance, 0 otherwise 
   
(2.38) (2.44)  (2.08) 
Indicator is 1 if banks may sell insurance  
   
-2.12** -1.06  -.50 
in the state 
   
(.99) (1.02)  (.87) 
Relative size of insurance in states where  
   
-1.95*** -1.17**  -.52 
banks may not sell insurance, 0 otherwise 
   
(.62) (.54)  (.54) 
Small firm share of the number of firms 
   
-11.27*** -12.50*** -16.28*** 
 in the state 
   
(3.20) (3.31)  (4.23) 
Share of state government controlled by  
   
.25 .41**  .12 
Democrats 
   
(.20) (.20)  (.17) 
Indicator is 1 if state controlled by  
   
.04 .06  .18 
one party 
   
(.12) (.10)  (.16) 
Average yield on bank loans in the state  
   
-2.44 -5.35  -6.23 
minus Fed funds rate 
   
(6.65) (6.33)  (4.57) 
Indicator is 1 if state has unit  
   
.29** .24* .23 
banking law 
   
(.13) (.13)  (.14) 
Indicator is 1 if state changes bank  
   
.00 -.03  -.13 
insurance powers 
   
(.20) (.15)  (.19) 
           
Regional indicators   No  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 408  408  408  408  408 
NOTE - The model is a Weibul hazard model where the dependent variable is the log expected time to bank branch 
deregulation. All the right-hand side variables are included in levels. Sample period is 1976 to 1994 and the sample 
comprises 37 states that deregulated after 1977. States drop from the sample once they deregulate. Data on per capita Gross 
State Product are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Proportion blacks, high-school dropouts, and female-headed 
households are calculated from the March Supplements to the Current Population Surveys. Data on unemployment rate are 
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. All other control variables are taken from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
Standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 Table 3 










   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
PANEL A: NO CONTROLS 
       
Bank deregulation  -0.022*** -0.041**  -0.135**  -0.077*** 
 
(0.008) (0.016)  (0.058)  (0.020) 
R2 0.35  0.43  0.74  0.60 
Observations 1,519  1,519  1,519  1,519 
         
PANEL B: WITH CONTROLS 
       
Bank deregulation  -0.018*** -0.032**  -0.101**  -0.066*** 
 
(0.006) (0.014)  (0.050)  (0.017) 
Growth rate of per capita GDP ($2000)  -0.028  -0.050  -0.140  -0.114 
 
(0.041) (0.081)  (0.229)  (0.119) 
Proportion blacks  -0.218  -0.462  -0.826  -0.231 
 
(0.154) (0.320)  (1.451)  (0.473) 
Proportion high-school dropouts  0.140*  0.219  0.432  -0.072 
 
(0.071) (0.147)  (0.635)  (0.155) 
Proportion female-headed households 0.017 0.028  0.226  0.102 
 
(0.058) (0.125)  (0.501)  (0.153) 
Unemployment rate  0.006*** 0.013***  0.069*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.003) 
R2 0.39  0.46  0.75  0.63 
Observations 1,519  1,519  1,519  1,519 
NOTE - The table shows the impact of bank deregulation on the natural logarithm of the different 
measures of income inequality. The number of observations in each regression corresponds to 49 states 
(we exclude Delaware and South Dakota) times 31 years between 1976 and 2006. All models control for 
state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level and appear in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  Table 4 
THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON LOG GINI COEFFICIENT OF INCOME INEQUALITY  
AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL STATE CHARACTERISTICS 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank deregulation  -.012  -.014*  .019  .577** 
 
(.008) (.008) (.013) (.253) 
Deregulation x (unit banking)  -.020* 
     
 
(.010) 
     
Deregulation x (initial population dispersion) 
 
-.180** 
   
   
(.079) 
   
Deregulation x (initial share of small banks) 
   
-.326*** 
 
     
(.111) 
 
Deregulation x (initial share of small firms) 
     
-.674** 
       
(.287) 
Linear combination  -.032*** 
     
 
(.010) 
     
    Evaluated at the 25th percentile 
 
-.016** -.003  -.009 
   
(.007) (.008) (.008) 
    Evaluated at the 50th percentile 
 
-.017** -.014* -.016** 
   
(.007) (.007) (.007) 
    Evaluated at the 75th percentile 
 
-.021*** -.027*** -.026*** 
   
(.007) (.008) (.008) 
         
Observations  1,519 1,519 1,209 1,209 
NOTE – The table presents estimates of the impact of bank deregulation on income inequality as a 
function of initial state characteristics. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Gini 
coefficient. All models control for state and year fixed effects. Since we control for state fixed effects 
the initial state characteristics are dropped from the regressions. Unit banking states are: CO, AR, FL, 
IL, IA, KS, MN, MO, MT, NE, ND, OK, TX, WI, WV, and WY. Data on population dispersion are from 
the Census Bureau. Data on the share of small banks and small firms is obtained from Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999). These data exclude 10 states that deregulated in 1960 and therefore have 310 fewer 
state-year observations. Standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Table 5 
DECOMPOSING THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON INCOME INEQUALITY TO BETWEEN- AND 
WITHIN-GROUPS  
       Employment Groups: 
PANEL A:  







Bank deregulation  -.0103**  .0002 -.0105**  -.0077  -.0102** 
 (.0043)  (.0003)  (.0042)  (.0074)  (.0042) 
          
       Education Groups: 
PANEL B: 









Bank deregulation  -.0102**  -.0028** -.0074**  -.0086*  -.0039 
   (.0042)  (.0011)  (.0035)  (.0043)  (.0038) 
NOTE - The table reports the impact of intrastate deregulation on the Theil index of income 
inequality. The number of observations in each decomposition is 1,519, corresponding to 49 states 
(we exclude Delaware and South Dakota) times 31 years between 1976 and 2006. All 
decompositions control for state and year fixed. In panel A we divide the sample into two mutually 
exclusive groups: (a) those who are self-employed, and (b) those who work for wages. In panel B 
we divide the sample of wage workers into two mutually exclusive groups: (a) those with twelve or 
less years of completed education, and (b) those with thirteen or more years of completed 
education. In the first column in both panels we estimate the overall impact of intrastate 
deregulation on the Theil index of inequality using all groups. In the next column we estimate the 
impact of deregulation on inequality between the different groups, whereas in the third column we 
estimate the impact of deregulation on inequality within the different groups combined. The second 
and the third columns add up to the first column. In the next columns we estimate the impact of 
deregulation on income inequality separately within each of the groups. Standard errors are 
adjusted for state level clustering and appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
PANEL A: AGES 25-54, UNCONDITIONAL EARNINGS 
   
Bank deregulation  -0.022**  -0.042** -0.094***  -0.051*** 
 
(0.008) (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.017) 
R2 0.13  0.26  0.47  0.33 
Observations 1,519  1,519  1,519  1,519 
         
PANEL B: AGES 30-54, UNCONDITIONAL EARNINGS 
   
Bank deregulation  -0.023***  -0.045** -0.111***  -0.058*** 
 
(0.009) (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.017) 
R2 0.11  0.24  0.46  0.35 
Observations 1,519  1,519  1,519  1,519 
         
PANEL C: AGES 35-54, UNCONDITIONAL EARNINGS 
   
Bank deregulation  -0.019**  -0.036** -0.072**  -0.055*** 
 
(0.008) (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.016) 
R2 0.11  0.22  0.42  0.33 
Observations 1,519  1,519  1,519  1,519 
         
PANEL D: AGES 25-54, EARNINGS CONDITIONAL ON EDUCATION 
 
Bank deregulation  -0.037***  -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.012) (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.013) 
R2 0.58  0.51  0.59  0.50 
Observations 1,519  1,519  1,519  1,519 
NOTE – The table shows the impact of bank deregulation on the natural logarithm of 
different measures of earnings inequality. Standard errors are adjusted for state level 
clustering and appear in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year 
fixed effects and do not include other control variables. In panels A-C, the inequality 
measures are based on real annual earnings as reported by CPS respondents. Panels 
A-C differ only in the ages of the respondents. In panel D, in contrast, we first regress 
log real annual earnings on six educational categories corresponding to years of 
completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, 16, and 16+) and then calculate measures of 
inequality based on the residuals.  
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Alabama AL  1981 
 
Montana MT  1990 
Alaska AK  1960 
 
Nebraska NE  1985 
Arizona AZ  1960 
 
Nevada NV  1960 
Arkansas AR  1994 
 
New Hampshire  NH  1987 
California CA  1960 
 
New Jersey  NJ  1977 
Colorado CO  1991 
 
New Mexico  NM  1991 
Connecticut CT  1980 
 
New York  NY  1976 
Delaware DE  1960 
 
North Carolina  NC  1960 
District of Columbia  DC  1960 
 
North Dakota  ND  1987 
Florida FL  1988 
 
Ohio OH  1979 
Georgia GA  1983 
 
Oklahoma OK  1988 
Hawaii HI  1986 
 
Oregon OR  1985 
Idaho ID  1960 
 
Pennsylvania PA 1982 
Illinois IL  1988 
 
Rhode Island  RI  1960 
Indiana IN  1989 
 
South Carolina  SC  1960 
Iowa IA  1999 
 
South Dakota  SD  1960 
Kansas KS  1987 
 
Tennessee TN  1985 
Kentucky KY  1990 
 
Texas TX  1988 
Louisiana LA  1988 
 
Utah UT  1981 
Maine ME  1975 
 
Vermont VT  1970 
Maryland MD  1960 
 
Virginia VA  1978 
Massachusetts MA  1984 
 
Washington WA  1985 
Michigan MI  1987 
 
West Virginia  WV  1987 
Minnesota MN  1993 
 
Wisconsin WI  1990 
Mississippi MS  1986 
 
Wyoming WY  1988 
Missouri  MO  1990             
NOTE – The table shows the year of branch deregulation for each state. Source: Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
 
  Appendix Table 2 
DIFFERENT MEASURES OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
Measure Mathematical  Expression  Interpretation Advantages  Disadvantages 
Gini 
coefficient 
1 - 2∫L(x)dx, 
where L() is the Lorenz 
curve showing the relation 
between the percentage of 
income recipients and the 
percentage of income they 
earn.  
The Gini coefficient 
is equal to 0 in the 
case of perfect 
equality when 
exactly s percent of 
total income is held 
by bottom s 
individuals 
(s=1,...,100). The 
Gini coefficient is 
equal to 1 if all the 
income is held by 
one individual. 
[1] Very intuitive 
and widely used.  




[1] Sensitive to 
changes in the 
middle of the 
distribution.  
[2] Not easily 
decomposable 
to between- and 
within-group 
inequality. 
        
Theil index  n-1∑i{(yi/μ)ln(yi/μ)}, 
where i indexes individuals 
(i=1,…,n), y is personal 
income, and μ is the mean 
value of y. The first term 
inside the sum is 
individual’s share of total 
income and the second term 
is that individual’s income 
relative to the mean. 
If all individuals 
have the same (i.e., 
mean) income, then 
the Theil index is 0. 
If one individual 
has all the income, 









        
Log(75/25) ln(y75) – ln(y25), 
where y75 and y25 are the 
75th and the 25th percentiles 
of personal income 
distribution (y), 
respectively. 
The ratio is equal to 
0 if the 75th and the 
25th percentiles of 
the distribution are 
equal. There is no 
upper bound to the 
ratio. 
[1] Intuitive 
measure of the 
percentage 
difference 
between the third 
and the first 
quartiles of a 
distribution.  






        
Log(90/10) ln(y90) – ln(y10), 
where y75 and y25 are the 
90th and the 10th percentiles 
of personal income 
distribution (y), 
respectively. 
The ratio is equal to 
0 if the 90th and the 
10th percentiles of 
the distribution are 
equal. There is no 
upper bound to the 
ratio. 
[1] Intuitive 
measure of the 
percentage 
difference 
between the top 
and the bottom 
deciles of a 
distribution.  







  Appendix Table 3 
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
    
Total number of observations in the March Current Population Surveys in the years 1977-2007:  5,085,135 
     
Sample restrictions (observations deleted):    
1. Persons between the ages of 25 and 54 with non-negative personal income below the 99th   (3,154,652) 
percentile     
     
2. Non-missing years of completed education and demographic characteristics    (21,786) 
     
     
3. Not residing in group quarters    (2,142) 
     
     
4. Not residing in Delaware or South Dakota    (45,780) 
     
     
5. With positive total household income    (1,276) 
     
     
6. Positive and non-missing sampling weights    (88) 
     
     
Total number of observations that satisfy sample restrictions above:     1,859,411 
NOTE – March Current Population Surveys (CPS) are available at <http://cps.ipums.org/cps/>. We start with the 1977 survey 
because exact state of residence is not available prior to 1977. We follow the literature and exclude Delaware and South Dakota 
because of large concentration of credit card banks in these states. From 1977 to 1982, group quarters included housing units 
containing five or more people unrelated to the person in charge. As of 1983, group quarters were defined in the CPS as non-
institutional living arrangements for groups not living in conventional housing units or groups living in housing units 
containing ten or more unrelated people or nine or more people unrelated to the person in charge. Because we use sampling 
weights to construct measures of income inequality, we exclude persons with missing or zero sampling weights. 
 
  Figure 1 
TIMING OF BANK DEREGULATION AND PRE-EXISTING INCOME INEQUALITY: GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
NOTE – Figure (A) shows a scatter plot of the average Gini coefficient of income 
inequality prior to bank deregulation and the year of bank deregulation. Figure (B) 
shows a scatter plot of the average change in the Gini coefficient of income inequality 
prior to bank deregulation and the year of bank deregulation. The t-statistics for the 
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Average change in the Gini coefficient prior to bank deregulation
(B)Figure 2 
THE DYNAMIC IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON LOG GINI COEFFICIENT 
 
NOTE – The figure plots the impact of intrastate bank deregulation on the natural logarithm 
of the  Gini coefficient of income inequality. We consider a 25 year window, spanning from 
10 years before deregulation until 15 years after deregulation. The dashed lines represent 
95% confidence intervals, adjusted for state-level clustering. Specifically, we report estimated 
coefficients from the following regression: 
log(Gini)st = α + β1D-10st + β2D-9st + … + β25D+15st + As +Bt + εst 
The D’s equal zero, except as follows: D-j equals one for states in the jth year before 
deregulation, while D+j equals one for states in the jth year after deregulation. We exclude the 
year of deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of deregulation on the different 
percentiles of income distribution relative to the year of deregulation. As and Bt are vectors 































-10 -5 0 5 10 15
Years before/after intrastate deregulationFigure 3 
THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON DIFFERENT PERCENTILES OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
NOTE – Each bar in the figure represents the estimated impact of bank deregulation on a natural 
logarithm of a specific percentile of income distribution. Dark bars represent estimates significant 
at 5% after adjusting the standard errors for clustering. Light bars represent statistically 
insignificant estimates. Specifically, we report the estimates of γ from 19 separate regressions of 
the following form: 
Y(i)st = α + γDst + As +Bt + εst 
where Y(i)st is the natural logarithm of ith percentile of income distribution in state s and year t. 
Dst is a dummy variable which equals to zero prior to bank deregulation and equals to one 
afterwards. As and Bt are vectors of state and year dummy variables that account for state and 
year fixed effects, respectively. Each of the 19 regressions has 1,519 observations corresponding to 































5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Percentile of income distribution
Significant at 5% Not significant